The Court's unanimous ruling upholding an important part of a new anti-terrorism law that restricts appeals by death-row prisoners and other convicts. Rejecting a challenge to the law in a case involving a death-row inmate from Georgia, Chief Justice William Rehnquist said the law does not improperly limit the Supreme Court's own ability to consider successive appeals by inmates against their convictions or sentences.

The issue before the court was a section of the law that completely shuts off an avenue of Supreme Court review for a category of federal habeas appeals by inmates who claim violations of their constitutional rights.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus



FELKER

v.

TURPIN, WARDEN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-8836 (A-890).  Argued June 3, 1996-Decided June 28,
1996

After he was convicted of murder and other crimes and sentenced to
death by a Georgia state court, petitioner was denied relief on direct
appeal, in two rounds of state collateral proceedings, and in a first
round of federal habeas corpus proceedings. While he was awaiting
execution, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Act), Title I of which, as here
pertinent, requires dismissal of a claim presented in a state prisoner's
second or successive federal habeas application if the claim was also
presented in a prior application, Section 106(b)(1); compels dismissal
of a claim that was not presented in a prior federal application, unless
certain conditions apply, Section 106(b)(2); creates a "gatekeeping"
mechanism, whereby the prospective applicant files in the court of
appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas
application in the district court, and a three-judge panel determines
whether the application makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies
Section 106(b)'s requirements, Section 106(b)(3); and declares that a
panel's grant or denial of authorization to file ``shall not be
appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for . . . writ of
certiorari,'' Section 106(b)(3)(E). Petitioner filed a motion for leave
to file a second federal habeas petition, which the Eleventh Circuit
denied on the grounds, inter alia, that the claims to be raised therein
had not been presented in his first petition and did not meet Section
106(b)(2)'s conditions. Petitioner then filed in this Court a pleading
styled a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [and] for Appellate or
Certiorari Review . . . ."  The Court granted certiorari, ordering
briefing on the extent to which Title I's provisions apply to a habeas
petition filed in this Court, whether application of the Act suspended
habeas in this case, and whether Title I, especially Section
106(b)(3)(E), unconstitutionally restricts the Court's jurisdiction.


Held:

1. The Act does not preclude this Court from entertaining an
application for habeas corpus relief, although it does affect the
standards governing the granting of such relief. Pp. 5-10.

(a) Title I does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to entertain
habeas petitions filed as original matters pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
Sections 2241 and 2254. No Title I provision mentions the Court's
authority to entertain such original petitions; in contrast, Section 103
amends the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to bar consideration
of original habeas petitions in the courts of appeals. Although
Section 106(b)(3)(E) precludes the Court from reviewing, by appeal
or certiorari, the latter courts' decisions exercising the "gatekeeping"
function for second habeas petitions, it makes no mention of the
Court's original habeas jurisdiction. Thus, the Court declines to find
a repeal of Section 2241 by implication. See Ex parte Yerger, 8
Wall. 85, 105. This conclusion obviates any claim by petitioner
under the Constitution's Exceptions Clause, Art. III, Section 2,
which provides, inter alia, that, "[i]n all . . . Cases . . . the Supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make."  Since the Act
does not repeal the Court's authority to entertain a habeas petition,
there can be no plausible argument that it deprives the Court of
appellate jurisdiction in violation of that Clause. Pp. 6-9.

(b) Title I changes the standards governing this Court's consideration
of habeas petitions by imposing new requirements under 28 U. S. C.
Section 2254(a), which limits the Court's authority to grant relief to
state prisoners. Section 106(b)(3)'s "gatekeeping" system does not
apply to the Court because it is limited to applications "filed in the
district court."  There is no such limitation, however, on the
restrictions imposed by Sections 106(b)(1) and (2), and those
restrictions inform the Court's authority to grant relief on original
habeas petitions, whether or not the Court is bound by the
restrictions. Pp. 9-10.

2. The Act does not violate the Constitution's Suspension Clause,
Art. I, Section 9, cl. 2, which provides that "[t]he Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended."  The new
restrictions on successive habeas petitions constitute a modified res
judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas practice "abuse of
the writ."  The doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and
evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by
historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions.
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 489. The new restrictions are
well within the compass of this evolutionary process and do not
amount to a "suspension" of the writ. Pp. 10-12.

3. The petition for an original writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Petitioner's claims do not satisfy the Section 106(b)(2) requirements,
let alone this Court's Rule 20.4(a), which requires that the habeas
petitioner show "exceptional circumstances" justifying the issuance
of the writ and says that habeas relief is rarely granted. Petitioner's
claims here do not materially differ from numerous other claims made
by successive habeas petitioners that the Court has had occasion to
review on stay applications. P. 12.

Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction; writ of habeas corpus
denied.

REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOUTER and
BREYER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which STEVENS and BREYER, JJ., joined.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme
Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any
typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be
made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 95-8836


ELLIS WAYNE FELKER, PETITIONER

v.

TONY TURPIN, WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND ON
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[June 28, 1996]

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Act) works substantial changes to chapter 153 of Title 28 of the
United States Code, which authorizes federal courts to grant the writ
of habeas corpus. Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217. We hold that
the Act does not preclude this Court from entertaining an application
for habeas corpus relief, although it does affect the standards
governing the granting of such relief. We also conclude that the
availability of such relief in this Court obviates any claim by
petitioner under the Exceptions Clause of Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution, and that the operative provisions of the Act do not
violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, Section 9.


On a night in 1976, petitioner approached Jane W. in his car as she
got out of hers. Claiming to be lost and looking for a party nearby,
he used a series of deceptions to induce Jane to accompany him to his
trailer home in town. Petitioner forcibly subdued her, raped her, and
sodomized her. Jane pleaded with petitioner to let her go, but he said
he could not because she would notify the police. She escaped later,
when petitioner fell asleep. Jane notified the police, and petitioner
was eventually convicted of aggravated sodomy and sentenced to 12
years' imprisonment.

Petitioner was paroled four years later. On November 23, 1981, he
met Joy Ludlam, a cocktail waitress, at the lounge where she
worked. She was interested in changing jobs, and petitioner used a
series of deceptions involving offering her a job at "The Leather
Shoppe," a business he owned, to induce her to visit him the next
day. The last time Joy was seen alive was the evening of the next
day. Her dead body was discovered two weeks later in a creek.
Forensic analysis established that she had been beaten, raped, and
sodomized, and that she had been strangled to death before being left
in the creek. Investigators discovered hair resembling petitioner's on
Joy's body and clothes, hair resembling Joy's in petitioner's
bedroom, and clothing fibers like those in Joy's coat in the hatchback
of petitioner's car. One of petitioner's neighbors reported seeing
Joy's car at petitioner's house the day she disappeared.

A jury convicted petitioner of murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and
false imprisonment. Petitioner was sentenced to death on the murder
charge. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction
and death sentence, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S. E. 2d 621,
and we denied certiorari, 469 U. S. 873 (1984). A state trial court
denied collateral relief, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to issue
a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial, and we again
denied certiorari. Felker v. Zant, 502 U. S. 1064 (1992).

Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia,
alleging that (1) the State's evidence was insufficient to convict him;
(2) the State withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); (3) petitioner's counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at sentencing; (4) the State improperly used
hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory; and (5) the State violated
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles by using
petitioner's crime against Jane W. as evidence at petitioner's trial for
crimes against Joy Ludlam. The District Court denied the petition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
52 F. 3d 907, extended on denial of petition for rehearing, 62 F. 3d
342 (1995), and we denied certiorari, 516 U. S. ___ (1996).

The State scheduled petitioner's execution for the period May 2-9,
1996. On April 29, 1996, petitioner filed a second petition for state
collateral relief. The state trial court denied this petition May 1, and
the Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari May 2.

On April 24, 1996, the President signed the Act into law. Title I of
this Act contained a series of amendments to existing federal habeas
corpus law. The provisions of the Act pertinent to this case concern
second or successive habeas corpus applications by state prisoners.
Subsections 106(b)(1) and (b)(2) specify the conditions under which
claims in second or successive applications must be dismissed,
amending 28 U. S. C. Section 2244(b) to read:

"(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed.

"(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed unless--

"(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

"(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

"(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense."  110 Stat. 1220-1221.

Subsection 106(b)(3) creates a "gatekeeping" mechanism for the
consideration of second or successive applications in district court.
The prospective applicant must file in the court of appeals a motion
for leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the
district court. Section 106(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel has 30 days
to determine whether "the application makes a prima facie showing
that the application satisfies the requirements of" Section 106(b).
Section 106(b)(3)(C); see  Sections 106(b)(3)(B), (D). Section
106(b)(3)(E) specifies that "[t]he grant or denial of an authorization
by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall
not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for
rehearing or for a writ of certiorari."

On May 2, 1996, petitioner filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit a motion for stay of execution and a
motion for leave to file a second or successive federal habeas corpus
petition under Section 2254. Petitioner sought to raise two claims in
his second petition, the first being that the state trial court violated
due process by equating guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" with
"moral certainty" of guilt in voir dire and jury instructions. See Cage
v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990). He also alleged that qualified
experts, reviewing the forensic evidence after his conviction, had
established that Joy must have died during a period when petitioner
was under police surveillance for Joy's disappearance and thus had a
valid alibi. He claimed that the testimony of the State's forensic
expert at trial was suspect because he is not a licensed physician, and
that the new expert testimony so discredited the State's testimony at
trial that petitioner had a colorable claim of factual innocence.

The Court of Appeals denied both motions the day they were filed,
concluding that petitioner's claims had not been presented in his first
habeas petition, that they did not meet the standards of Section
106(b)(2) of the Act, and that they would not have satisfied pre-Act
standards for obtaining review on the merits of second or successive
claims. 83 F. 3d 1303 (CA11 1996). Petitioner filed in this Court a
pleading styled a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, for Appellate
or Certiorari Review of the Decision of the United States Circuit
Court for the Eleventh Circuit, and for Stay of Execution."  On May
3, we granted petitioner's stay application and petition for certiorari.
We ordered briefing on the extent to which the provisions of Title I
of the Act apply to a petition for habeas corpus filed in this Court,
whether application of the Act suspended the writ of habeas corpus in
this case, and whether Title I of the Act, especially Section
106(b)(3)(E), constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on the
jurisdiction of this Court. 517 U. S. ___ (1996).


We first consider to what extent the provisions of Title I of the Act
apply to petitions for habeas corpus filed as original matters in this
Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. Sections 2241 and 2254. We
conclude that although the Act does impose new conditions on our
authority to grant relief, it does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction
to entertain original habeas petitions.


Section 106(b)(3)(E) of the Act prevents this Court from reviewing a
court of appeals order denying leave to file a second habeas petition
by appeal or by writ of certiorari. More than a century ago, we
considered whether a statute barring review by appeal of the
judgment of a circuit court in a habeas case also deprived this Court
of power to entertain an original habeas petition. Ex parte Yerger, 8
Wall. 85 (1869). We consider the same question here with respect to
Section 106(b)(3)(E).

Yerger's holding is best understood in the light of the availability of
habeas corpus review at that time. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 authorized all federal courts, including this Court, to grant the
writ of habeas corpus, when prisoners were "in custody, under or by
colour of the authority of the United States, or [were] committed for
trial before some court of the same."  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
Section 14, 1 Stat. 82.1   Congress greatly expanded the scope of
federal habeas corpus in 1867, authorizing federal courts to grant the
writ, "in addition to the authority already conferred by law," "in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States."  Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.2   Before the Act
of 1867, the only instances in which a federal court could issue the
writ to produce a state prisoner were if the prisoner was "necessary
to be brought into court to testify," Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
Section 14, 1 Stat. 82, was "committed . . . for any act done . . . in
pursuance of a law of the United States," Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch.
57, Section 7, 4 Stat. 634-635, or was a "subjec[t] or citize[n] of a
foreign State, and domiciled therein," and held under state law, Act
of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539-540.

The Act of 1867 also expanded our statutory appellate jurisdiction to
authorize appeals to this Court from the final decision of any circuit
court on a habeas petition. 14 Stat. 386. This enactment changed the
result of Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103 (1847), in which we had
held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not authorize this Court to
conduct appellate review of circuit court habeas decisions. However,
in 1868, Congress revoked the appellate jurisdiction it had given in
1867, repealing "so much of the [Act of 1867] as authorizes an
appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the Supreme Court of
the United States."  Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, Section 2, 15 Stat.
44.

In Yerger, we considered whether the Act of 1868 deprived us not
only of power to hear an appeal from a inferior court's decision on a
habeas petition, but also of power to entertain a habeas petition to this
Court under Section 14 of the Act of 1789. We concluded that the
1868 Act did not affect our power to entertain such habeas petitions.
We explained that the 1868 Act's text addressed only jurisdiction
over appeals conferred under the Act of 1867, not habeas jurisdiction
conferred under the Acts of 1789 and 1867. We rejected the
suggestion that the Act of 1867 had repealed our habeas power by
implication. Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105. Repeals by implication are not
favored, we said, and the continued exercise of original habeas
jurisdiction was not "repugnant" to a prohibition on review by appeal
of circuit court habeas judgments. Ibid.

Turning to the present case, we conclude that Title I of the Act has
not repealed our authority to entertain original habeas petitions, for
reasons similar to those stated in Yerger. No provision of Title I
mentions our authority to entertain original habeas petitions; in
contrast, Section 103 amends the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure to bar consideration of original habeas petitions in the
courts of appeals.3   Although Section 106(b) (3)(E) precludes us
from reviewing, by appeal or petition for certiorari, a judgment on an
application for leave to file a second habeas petition in district court,
it makes no mention of our authority to hear habeas petitions filed as
original matters in this Court. As we declined to find a repeal of
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as applied to this Court by
implication then, we decline to find a similar repeal of Section 2241
of Title 28--its descendant, n. 1, supra--by implication now.

This conclusion obviates one of the constitutional challenges raised.
The critical language of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution
provides that, apart from several classes of cases specifically
enumerated in this Court's original jurisdiction, "[i]n all the other
Cases... the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make."  Previous decisions construing this
clause have said that while our appellate powers "are given by the
constitution," "they are limited and regulated by the [Judiciary Act of
1789], and by such other acts as have been passed on the subject."
Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch 307, 314 (1810); see also
United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 172-173 (1805). The Act does
remove our authority to entertain an appeal or a petition for a writ of
certiorari to review a decision of a court of appeals exercising its
"gatekeeping" function over a second petition. But since it does not
repeal our authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, there
can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court of
appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, Section 2.


We consider next how Title I affects the requirements a state prisoner
must satisfy to show he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus from
this Court. Title I of the Act has changed the standards governing
our consideration of habeas petitions by imposing new requirements
for the granting of relief to state prisoners. Our authority to grant
habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by Section 2254, which
specifies the conditions under which such relief may be granted to "a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court."4
Section 2254(a). Several sections of the Act impose new
requirements for the granting of relief under this section, and they
therefore inform our authority to grant such relief as well.

Section 106(b) of the Act addresses second or successive habeas
petitions. Section 106(b)(3)'s "gatekeeping" system for second
petitions does not apply to our consideration of habeas petitions
because it applies to applications "filed in the district court."  Section
106(b)(3)(A). There is no such limitation, however, on the
restrictions on repetitive and new claims imposed by subsections
106(b)(1) and (2). These restrictions apply without qualification to
any "second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254."  Sections 106(b)(1), (2). Whether or not we are bound by
these restrictions, they certainly inform our consideration of original
habeas petitions.


Next, we consider whether the Act suspends the writ of habeas
corpus in violation of Article I, Section 9, clause 2, of the
Constitution. This clause provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different
from that which exists today. As we explained previously, the first
Congress made the writ of habeas corpus available only to prisoners
confined under the authority of the United States, not under state
authority. Supra, at 6-7; see Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103 (1844).
The class of judicial actions reviewable by the writ was more
restricted as well. In Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830), we
denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a prisoner
"detained in prison by virtue of the judgment of a court, which court
possesses general and final jurisdiction in criminal cases."  Id., at
202. Reviewing the English common law which informed American
courts' understanding of the scope of the writ, we held that "[t]he
judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself evidence of
its own legality," and that we could not "usurp that power by the
instrumentality of the writ of habeas corpus."  Id., at 207.

It was not until 1867 that Congress made the writ generally available
in "all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States."  Supra, at 6. And it was not until well into this century that
this Court interpreted that provision to allow a final judgment of
conviction in a state court to be collaterally attacked on habeas. See,
e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942); Brown v. Allen,
344 U. S. 443 (1953). But we assume, for purposes of decision
here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ
as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789. See Swain v.
Pressley, 430 U. S. 372 (1977); id., at 385 (Burger, C. J.,
concurring).

The Act requires a habeas petitioner to obtain leave from the court of
appeals before filing a second habeas petition in the district court.
But this requirement simply transfers from the district court to the
court of appeals a screening function which would previously have
been performed by the district court as required by 28 U. S. C.
Section 2254 Rule 9(b). The Act also codifies some of the pre-
existing limits on successive petitions, and further restricts the
availability of relief to habeas petitioners. But we have long
recognized that "the power to award the writ by any of the courts of
the United States, must be given by written law," Ex parte Bollman,
4 Cranch 75, 94 (1807), and we have likewise recognized that
judgments about the proper scope of the writ are "normally for
Congress to make."  Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U. S. ___, ___ (slip
op., at 8).

The new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res
judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice
"abuse of the writ."  In McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 (1991),
we said that "the doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and
evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by
historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions."
Id., at 489. The added restrictions which the Act places on second
habeas petitions are well within the compass of this evolutionary
process, and we hold that they do not amount to a "suspension" of
the writ contrary to Article I, Section 9.


We have answered the questions presented by the petition for
certiorari in this case, and we now dispose of the petition for an
original writ of habeas corpus. Our Rule 20.4(a) delineates the
standards under which we grant such writs:

"A petition seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus shall
comply with the requirements of 28 U. S. C. Sections 2241 and
2242, and in particular with the provision in the last paragraph of
Section 2242 requiring a statement of the `reasons for not making
application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is
held.'  If the relief sought is from the judgment of a state court, the
petition shall set forth specifically how and wherein the petitioner has
exhausted available remedies in the state courts or otherwise comes
within the provisions of 28 U. S. C. Section 2254(b). To justify the
granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must show
exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court's
discretionary powers and must show that adequate relief cannot be
obtained in any other form or from any other court. These writs are
rarely granted."

Reviewing petitioner's claims here, they do not materially differ from
numerous other claims made by successive habeas petitioners which
we have had occasion to review on stay applications to this Court.
Neither of them satisfies the requirements of the relevant provisions
of the Act, let alone the requirement that there be "exceptional
circumstances" justifying the issuance of the writ.

The petition for writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. The petition for an original writ of habeas corpus is
denied.

It is so ordered.


ENDNOTES

1 Section 14 is the direct ancestor of 28 U. S. C. Section 2241,
subsection (a) of which now states in pertinent part: "Writs of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions."

2 This language from the 1867 Act is the direct ancestor of Section
2241(c)(3), which states: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend
to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."

3 Section 103 of the Act amends Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
22(a) to read: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be
made to the appropriate district court. If application is made to a
circuit judge, the application shall be transferred to the appropriate
district court. If an application is made to or transferred to the district
court and denied, renewal of the application before a circuit judge
shall not be permitted. The applicant may, pursuant to section 2253
of title 28, United States Code, appeal to the appropriate court of
appeals from the order of the district court denying the writ."

4 As originally enacted in 1948, 28 U. S. C. Section 2254 specified
that "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State."  28 U. S. C. Section
2254 (1946 ed., Supp. III). The reviser's notes, citing Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944), indicated that "[t]his new section is
declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court."
Reviser's Note following 28 U. S. C. Section 2254, p. 1109 (1946
ed., Supp. III). Hawk was one of a series of opinions in which we
applied the exhaustion requirement first announced in Ex parte
Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886), to deny relief to applicants seeking
writs of habeas corpus from this Court.